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 A group recommender approach based on multi-agent systems is proposed. 
 The approach replaces the traditional aggregation techniques with negotiation. 
 The group members are satisfied in a more even way than with traditional 
approaches. 
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Abstract
Providing recommendations to groups of users has become a promising research
area, since many items tend to be consumed by groups of people. Various tech-
niques have been developed aiming at making recommendations to a group as a
whole. Most works use aggregation techniques to combine preferences, recom-
mendations or proles. However, satisfying all group members in an even way
still remains as a challenge. To deal with this problem, we propose an extension
of a multi-agent approach based on negotiation techniques for group recommen-
dation. In the approach, we use the multilateral Monotonic Concession Protocol
(MCP) to combine individual recommendations into a group recommendation.
In this work, we extend the MCP protocol to allow users to personalize the
behavior of the agents. This extension was evaluated in two dierent domains
(movies and points of interest) with satisfactory results. We compared our ap-
proach against dierent baselines, namely: a preference aggregation algorithm,
a recommendation aggregation algorithm, and a simple one-step negotiation.
The results show evidence that, when using our negotiation approach, users
in the groups are more uniformly satised than with traditional aggregation
approaches.
Keywords: recommender systems, group recommendations, multi-agent
systems, negotiation
1. Introduction
Nowadays, when a user wants to purchase a product, contract a service or do
some activity (e.g., watching a movie), she often faces the problem of information
overload [1, 2]. This is because users must deal with a variety of potentially
interesting items in the target domain. In this context, a Recommender System
(RS) allows users to identify those items that match their needs, preferences,
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tastes, and goals. To carry out this task, several recommendation techniques
have been proposed in the literature [3, 4].
Most RS techniques have been developed to assist individual users. However,
in some domains such as movies, music or tourism, the recommendations can
serve groups of people as well as individuals. A Group Recommender System
(GRS) looks for item recommendations that are good for a group of users as a
whole. That is, the recommended items should satisfy, as much as possible, the
individual preferences of all group members [5]. Generating recommendations
that satisfy a group of users with possible competing interests is not straight-
forward. Traditional approaches make use of aggregation techniques in order to
produce group recommendations [6, 7, 8].
Although these traditional approaches are used in several domains, they still
present some limitations. First, aggregation techniques can produce values that
might not represent correctly the data being aggregated, especially when the
data to be aggregated is small and has a high variance. For example, let us
assume that 3 users rate a movie with scores 1, 1 and 5, respectively; then the
(aggregated) group rating can be: 2.33 (if the average aggregation technique
is used), 1 (if misery minimization or plurality voting is used), and 5 (if most
pleasure is used). From this simple example, we can see that neither of those
aggregated ratings truly represent the ratings given by the users. Because of this
problem, recommendations generated with aggregation techniques seldom sat-
isfy the group members in a uniform way. Second, the decision-making process
of the group and the group dynamics [9, 10] are not reected by the aggregation
technique [6, 9, 8]. By dynamics, we mean any kind of group behavior during the
decision making process that can inuence the decision result, such as: users'
concession proles, users' tolerance or inuence, among others. As a result,
traditional approaches can produce a recommendation that does not match the
group's interests or neglects one of the group members to satisfy others, which
often leads to the whole group rejecting the recommendation.
When a human group has to choose an item, its members generally dis-
cuss and analyze their options for achieving a consensus on the item. Dierent
methods can be used to achieve consensus, such as: voting, auction-biding or
negotiation [11]. Particularly, the negotiation method is expected to generate
recommendations that satisfy the group members more uniformly than tradi-
tional approaches. Along this line, we proposed a multi-agent approach for
group recommendation called PUMAS-GR [12], which was later re-named to
MAGReS (Multi-Agent Group Recommender System). In MAGReS, a personal
agent represents each user of a group. This personal agent knows the user's pref-
erences and acts on her behalf when making item proposals to other agents and
looking for agreements. These agreements are achieved by the agents through
a cooperative negotiation process. Particularly, we chose a multilateral nego-
tiation method known as Monotonic Concession Protocol (MCP) [13], since it
closely mirrors the way in which human negotiation seems to work [14]. We
argue that this approach helps to increase the quality of the group recommen-
dations by increasing the satisfaction of the group as a whole.
The general idea of the approach was initially presented in [12], including
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preliminary evaluation results. However, the agents were all equipped with one
single acceptance criterion for item proposals, which did not allow agent per-
sonalization by the users. By personalization, we mean that a user can change
the behavior of her representative agent to better capture her beliefs and how
the agent should act (accordingly) during a group negotiation. Thus, we argue
that dierent acceptance criteria need to be supported, so that each agent can
decide whether to accept or reject a given item proposal. Furthermore, in some
domains it is important to consider recommendations that contain items al-
ready rated by group members (in the past). These criteria can help to produce
recommendations being closer to what users expect, thus increasing the proba-
bility of those recommendations being accepted by the group. In this context,
the main contribution of this article is the development of two new decisions
strategies for the agents in MAGReS, which are also empirically assessed. We
additionally analyze the amount of information that a given user needs to reveal
(to other agents/users) when making group recommendations.
To demonstrate the feasibility of MAGReS with the two proposed strate-
gies, we have evaluated MAGReS in the movies domain (MovieLens) and in
the points of interest (POI) recommendation domain (Yelp). We performed dif-
ferent experiments, and compared our proposal against traditional approaches
for recommendation aggregation, preference aggregation, and a simple one-step
negotiation. The comparisons were carried out using both item-based and user-
based recommender systems. The eectiveness of the group recommendations
was assessed in terms of the average satisfaction of a group and how uniformly
the group members were satised. The results showed that the average group
satisfaction reported was high for the recommendations produced by MAGReS,
and also the group members were satised in a more uniform way than with
traditional appraoches.
The rest of the article is organized into 4 sections as follows. In Section 2
we discuss related works. In Section 3 we present the details of the MAGReS
approach. Then, in Section 4 we report on the experiments carried out to
evaluate our approach. Finally, in Section 5 we give the conclusions and outline
future lines of work.
2. Related Work
The generation of group recommendations began to be investigated in the RS
eld during the last decade [7, 15]. Traditional GRS can be classied into three
main categories according to the strategy they follow to generate the recom-
mendations. These categories include: (i) those that perform recommendation
aggregation [6], by producing individual recommendations for every member
of the group and then merging those recommendations; (ii) those that perform
preference aggregation [16, 17], by merging the individuals' preferences/ratings
in order to obtain a group evaluation for each candidate item; and (iii) those
that perform model/prole aggregation [18], by merging individuals' models
into a single group model rst and then generating suggestions based on that
model. There are various techniques for aggregating data, and their suitability
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depends on both the data being aggregated (it is not possible, for example,
to aggregate non-numeric data with an average) and the goal being pursued.
When it comes to merging individual recommendations, Mastho [19] analyzed
dierent techniques such as: average, average without misery, and least mis-
ery, among others. In [6], the authors analyzed the eectiveness of ranked list
recommendations tailored to a group of users using dierent methods such as:
Spearman footrule, Borda count, average and least misery [7, 20].
Multi-agent systems (MAS) have been applied in several areas and domains
(see Chapter 10 of [14]). Regarding RS, some approaches have proposed MAS
to generate recommendations both for individuals and groups. The way in
which RS and MAS are combined depends on the main goal of the combina-
tion. In some cases, they are combined as a way to improve the quality of the
recommendations [21, 22, 23]. In other cases, a MAS is used for recommen-
dations because its architecture allows developers to model the problem more
adequately and prescribes a clear assignment of responsibilities to the dierent
system modules [24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30]. Both ideas have been used together
in [31, 32, 33]. There are many references in the literature about MAS being
applied to RS for individual users in domains such as: adaptive customization
of websites [28], tourism [24, 26], games on mobile phones [34], TV shows [31],
training courses [27], and e-commerce [32, 23], among others.
However, when it comes to MAS being applied to GRS, only a few works
have been reported, mostly in the tourism domain. In [21], the authors present
a GRS in the tourism domain that relies on the application of cooperative agent-
based negotiation. The agents act on behalf of group members and participate in
a direct (alternating oers) or mediated (merging rankings) negotiation, which
ultimately produces group recommendations based on individual recommenda-
tions and user preference models. One of the limitations of this approach is that
it has only been tested with simulations involving two agents (therefore, it is a
group of two people). We argue that this kind of approaches should be assessed
in bigger groups in order to be practical for RS.
In [25] an agent-based negotiation schema that uses alternating oers is de-
veloped, in which the agents (each one representing a group member) negotiate
the preferences of the whole group. This approach is said to be suitable for ev-
ery domain, provided that the domain can be represented using ontologies. Like
MAGReS, this approach does not use aggregation techniques, but a negotiation
process in order to compute the group preferences. In [35] a rened version of
the approach is presented, in which new agent types are introduced for ltering
the list of items according to the group preferences (resulting from the negoti-
ation) and for mediating the negotiations among user agents. Our work diers
from [25, 35] in that they negotiate user preferences while MAGReS negotiates
recommendations. A similar idea is used by [36], with agents representing group
members and a mediator to coordinate the agents' work. An interesting aspect
of [36] is that a user agent not only tries to protect the interests of its repre-
sented user, but also models her behavior with respect to conicting situations.
In this way, the attitude and behavior of the agent changes (and adapts to the
situation) when looking for agreements during the negotiation. However, there
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are two dierences between MAGReS and [36], namely: (i) a protocol based on
a Merging Ranks technique (instead of MCP), and (ii) a preference aggregation
techniques used by the mediator agent (when computing the group rating for
each item).
In [33] a MAS-based system called e-Tourism is presented, which is able to
produce both individual and group recommendations. Nonetheless, this system
diers in that the agents are used for representing users but also for modeling
components of the RS. This approach diers from ours in that it relies on aggre-
gation techniques to generate the group recommendations (specically, prole
aggregation techniques are used in order to aggregate the group members' pro-
les into a single group prole).
In [37] the authors present a review of the state of the art in RS using MAS
from a game-theory point of view, with the objective of introducing examples
of how social-choice mechanisms can be extended using social information ex-
tracted from the analysis of interactions within a social network.
In [10] a GRS for points of interest (POI) that uses dynamic elicitation of
user preferences is proposed. The approach allows users to iteratively express
and revise their preferences during the decision making process through a chat-
based app . Although the main idea of this approach is similar to our approach,
, the app requires the users to discuss about the options and vote them, while
in MAGReS the discussion and negotiation are carried out by the agents.
3. Proposed Multi-agent Approach
In order to address the problems discussed in Section 1, we initially proposed
a multi-agent negotiation approach called PUMAS-GR (later renamed to MA-
GReS) as an alternative to aggregation techniques. In this article, we extend
MAGReS and develop two new strategies for the approach (see Section 3.4 and
Section 3.5), so as to enrich the modeling of the users' criteria and improve
both the quality and the acceptability of the recommendations. Additionally,
in Section 3.6 we discuss how the proposed approach aects the information pri-
vacy of the group members, in terms of how much information from each user
needs to be revealed to the rest of the group members (during the negotiation).
3.1. MAGReS
MAGReS (Multi-Agent Group Recommender System) is based on a MAS in
which each agent acts on behalf of a group member. Each agent maintains a
prole that contains the user's preferences and it is capable of (i) predicting
the rating the user would assign to an item not yet rated, and (ii) generating a
ranking of interesting items for the user (items the user would like). Initially,
the user's preferences are the ratings assigned by the user to the items she rated
in the past. MAGReS diers from traditional approaches (see Figure 1) that
normally work with a central entity, which employs some aggregation technique
(either for user proles, user preferences or single-user recommendations) in
tandem with a single-user recommender system. The novelty of MAGReS is the
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Figure 1: Traditional approach to group recommendation
replacement of aggregation techniques by a negotiation process in which a group
of User Agents (i.e., agents that represent the users) try to reach a consensus on
the most satisfying items for the group. Although various negotiation protocols
are possible, only a few of them have addressed two important properties for
us, namely: (i) mimic the negotiation process followed by humans, and (ii) be
suitable for multi-lateral negotiation. Based on these considerations, we chose
the protocol known as MCP (Monotonic Concession Protocol) [13] to guide the
negotiation. A general overview of our approach is shown in Figure 2. More
Figure 2: Proposed approach
formally, let A = {ag1, ag2, ..., agn} be a nite set of N cooperative agents, and
let X = {x1, x2, ...xm} be a nite set of potential agreements or proposals, each
one of them containing an item that can be recommended to one of the agents.
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Each agent agi ∈ A has a utility function Ui : X → [0, 1] that maps proposals
to its satisfaction value. In our approach, each agent internally relies on a
Single-User RS (SUR) to generate a ranking containing the items (candidate
proposals) proposed by the agent. The ranking is sorted in descendant order
according to the utility value of the item. This way, the set X can be seen as
the union of the rankings produced for all the agents, plus an special agreement
called conict deal, which yields utility 0 for all the agents and will be chosen
as the worst possible outcome (no agreement is possible).
For example, let us assume we want to generate recommendations of movies
to (groups of) users. Along this line, let us have a group of three friends who
want to watch a movie together, and a set of M possible movies to be chosen.
According to MAGReS, each user is equipped with her own personal agent that
is able to access her user prole. For simplicity, a prole includes only ratings
over (a subset of) the possible movies. A user rating rti(item) is a value (in
the range [0, 1] where 0 means dissatisfaction and 1 means high satisfaction)
assigned by the user i to the given item (i.e., a movie). Additionally, the utility
function of each agent agi ∈ A is dened as follows:
Ui(xj) =
{
rti(xj) if xj ∈ Ri
SURi(xj) if xj /∈ Ri
(1)
Where Ri is the list of items rated by user i (represented by agi) and
SURi(xj) is the rating predicted by the SURi, which is the single-user rec-
ommender system1 used by agi for generating its list of candidate proposals.
In this context, let us consider the following (initial) situation:
 ag1 handles ratings < rt1(M5) = 0.75, rt1(M3) = 0.56) > on behalf of
user #1,
 ag2 handles < rt2(M10) = 0.82, rt2(M52) = 0.65 > for user #2, and
 ag3 handles < rt3(M32) = 0.88, rt3(M46) = 0.8 > for user #3.
Then we have A = {ag1, ag2, ag3} as the MAS in which the negotiation for the
best movie (the one that will satisfy all the three agents) takes place.
3.2. Monotonic Concession Protocol (MCP)
The agents engage in rounds of negotiation, each one making proposals (of
items) that need to be assessed by the other agents, until an agreement is
reached or the negotiation nishes with a conict. Our agents abide by a set of
predened rules that specify the range of legal moves available at each agent
at any stage of the negotiation process. In MCP, these rules have to do with:
1Most single-user recommender systems provide a way to predict the rating of a user for
a given item. For example, the Mahout framework provides the estimatePreference function
that accepts the IDs of both a user and an item as parameters and returns the predicted
rating that particular user would assign to the item.
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Figure 3: Steps of the MCP for MAGReS (adapted from [13])
(i) the agreement criterion, (ii) which agent makes the next concession (after a
round with no agreement), and (iii) how much an agent should concede. The
protocol presents some limitations, namely: (i) an agent cannot inuence the
negotiation position of other agents (e.g., by exchanging a justication), and (ii)
an agent needs to assign quantitative utilities to proposals (often, via a utility
function). Additionally, in contrast to the benets provided by the multi-agent
system, there are some issues that might aect the performance of the recom-
mender system. For example, negotiation involves reasoning (i.e. computation
cost) and communication (i.e. communication overhead) [38]. However, we fo-
cus on two properties of the selected negotiation protocol to diminish the eects
of these issues: termination and deadlock-freedom. The MCP protocol guar-
antees (a) that any negotiation process following the protocol will eventually
terminate (termination), and (b) that at least one agent can concede satisfying
the concession criterion at any negotiation stage, until an agreement has been
reached. Taking into account both properties, as the overall number of agents is
nite, there can only be a nite number of concessions. Thus, the negotiation is
bound to terminate reaching an agreement or nishing in conict. The steps of
the MCP protocol are summarized in Figure 3. At the beginning (step 1), each
agent makes an initial proposal according to its own Initial Proposal strategy
(for example, the agent proposes its favorite or top-ranked item if its Initial
Proposal strategy is the one called Egocentric, i.e. it always selects the proposal
with the highest utility value for the agent). Then, the initial proposals of all
the agents are exchanged in order to determine if an agreement over one of the
proposals can be reached. The notion of agreement (also called deal) is dened
in terms of the utility of a given proposal for the agents. Thus, there is an
agreement if one agent makes a proposal that is at least as good (regarding
utility) for any other agent as their own current proposals. Formally, we rely
on the following criterion:
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Multilateral Agreement Criterion2: An agreement is reached if
and only if there is an agent agi ∈ A such that its proposal xi
is accepted by every other agent agk ∈ A. Whether a proposal
is accepted by each agent agk ∈ A is determined by the Proposal
Acceptance (PrA) strategy used by that agent (see Section 3.5).
If an agreement is reached, the proposal that satises all the agents is chosen (if
several proposals meet this criterion, we simply pick one of them randomly). On
the contrary, if no agreement can be reached, one (or more) of the agents must
concede. A concession means that an agent seeks an inferior proposal (for exam-
ple, in terms of its own utility), with the hope of reaching an agreement. If none
of the agents can concede, the process nishes with no-agreement (the conict
deal is returned). Several concession strategies are possible (see Section 3.3).
Also, note that even though an agent can exclude from its proposals those items
that her user has already rated, certain items proposed by the agent might have
been rated by some other user within the group. Along this line, users' opinions
with regard to recommendations of items they have already rated vary from
one user to another. Given that agents should take this situation into account
when assessing proposals sent by other agents, we propose the Already-Rated
Punishment (ARP) strategies for MCP (see Section 3.4).
3.3. Concession strategies
As it was explained before, when no agreement is reached during a round of
negotiation, at least one of the agents must concede. At this point, there are
two problems that need to be solved, namely: (i) determining which agent(s)
has to make the concession and (ii) selecting the next item to propose (i.e. the
new proposal).
3.3.1. Concession Decision Rule
From all the agents that can make an eective concession (i.e. those having
alternative proposals in their pool of proposals), it is necessary to nd the one(s)
that must concede in the next round of negotiation. One way for selecting the
conceding agent(s) is to apply the Zeuthen strategy [39] around the concept of
willingness to risk conict (WRC). This strategy was initially designed to be
used in bilateral negotiations and later extended to work in multi-lateral ones,
as explained in [12]3. The WRC for agi (WRCi) is then given by Equation 2:
WRCi =
{





2If the Strict PrA strategy is used this criterion works as the one proposed in [13]
3The product-increasing and sum of products strategies proposed by Zeuthen were
also generalized (from bilateral to multilateral negotiations) in [13] and are valid within our
framework, but we did not use them in the experiments reported in this article.
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Where Ui(xi) is the utility value for agi over the item it proposed (xi is the
most recent proposal made by agi), and Ui(xk) is the utility value for agi over
the item the agent agk proposed (xk). Once the WRCi of every agent is com-
puted, the agent(s) with the lowest WRCi value must make a concession. In
case two or more agents hold the same WRC value, dierent strategies can be
followed. Without losing generality, we make all those agents concede in our
implementation framework.
3.3.2. Concession strategy
Various strategies are discussed in the literature for deciding on the item the
conceding agent(s) should propose in the next round [13]. For our work, we ini-
tially selected the so-called Nash concession strategy, which states that an agent
makes a proposal such that the product of utilities of the other agents increases
(Nash product). When assessing the behavior of the Nash strategy in practical
cases, we observed that sometimes it leads to early conicts during the ne-
gotiation. An early conict is a situation in which all agents quickly exhaust
their potential proposals and the MCP ends with no deal. This is because once
the Nash product is high enough, the amount of candidate proposals reduces
drastically, and so does the number of agents that can make concessions. This
behavior therefore drives the negotiation to a premature end, and also makes
the agents discard potential agreements just because their Nash product was
not high enough. The same behavior was observed when using the Utilitarian
concession strategy (it uses addition instead of product of utilities). To mitigate
this problem, we dened a variation of the Utilitarian concession strategy called
Desires Distance.
Desires Distance (DD). DD attempts to measure how far a candidate proposal
is with respect to the desires of the other agents. Along this line, an agent
makes a proposal that is closer to the other agents' desires (we denote the
desires distance as ddvalue) but also has a utility value lower or equal than the
agent current proposal. DD guarantees termination and deadlock-freedom, the
demonstration follows from that for Utilitarian concession [13].
The DD strategy works as follows. Initially, we consider that agent agi must
make a concession and therefore nd a new item to propose (in the next round
of negotiation). To do this, we create a list with all the eligible candidate
proposals (i.e., proposals with a lower utility value than the current proposal),
and then we select the rst candidate from the list whose ddvalue is lower or
equal to the one of the current proposal. The ddvalue is computed as explained
in Equation 3. This strategy requires Uk(xi) − Uk(xk) < 0, because otherwise






where Uk(xi)− Uk(xk) < 0 and xk is the current proposal of agk (3)
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(a) Round 1 (b) Round 2 (c) Round k
Figure 4: MCP negotiation example over movies
Figure 4 shows an example of MCP when having a group of three users, each
one represented by one of the three agents (ag1, ag2 and ag3). In the rst round
(Figure 4a) each agent proposes a movie: ag1 proposes M1, ag2 proposes M24
and ag3 proposes M3. According to the previously dened agreement criterion
(Figure 3, step 2) there is no agreement, as none of the proposals satises all the
agents and, therefore, one (or more) of the agents has to make a concession. The
concession decision rule determines that ag2 must concede. For this example,
we used WRC (see Equation 2). At the beginning of Round 2 (Figure 4b),
ag2 uses DD to select her next proposal and as a result she proposes M10 (as
ddvalue(M10) = 0.26, ddvalue(M24) = 0.23 and ddvalue(M10) 6 ddvalue(M24)).
All the proposals are assessed again and the agreement criterion determines
that ag1 and ag3 will reject M10. The process repeats until reaching Round k,
in which ag3 proposes the movie M46 that satises all the agents and therefore
the negotiation ends successfully. Movie M46 will be then recommended to
the group of users. There are two observations that can be inferred from the
example. The rst one is that the negotiation is not guaranteed to terminate
successfully (with an agreement) among all the agents. The second one is that
more than one agreement are possible, meaning that in round k an agreement
could have existed over more than one proposal. In such a case, one of the
agreements should be selected and several selection strategies can be followed
(e.g. random selection, choose the one that maximizes the satisfaction of the
agents, among other criteria).
3.4. Already-Rated Punishment strategy
The recommended items will determine whether the recommendation is
(partially or fully) accepted by the group. Depending on the approach for
generating the recommendations, items that were rated by some of the group
members in the past might be recommended (again). For example, if a tradi-
tional preference-aggregation approach is used, during the preference aggrega-
tion stage, the RS needs to determine which items will be part of the group
preferences prole (i.e. those items whose ratings are computed using the ag-
gregation technique). The approach for selecting items might vary from one RS
to another. If all the items rated by at least one of the group members are used
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during the aggregation process, then there is no way an item being already rated
by a group member will be included in the recommendation. However, if only
a subset of the items rated by at least one of the group members is considered,
those items that were not included in the group preference prole have a chance
of being recommended, especially if they received a high rating by the users.
During the eld test of our approach [40], we observed that while some
users would give a low feedback to recommendations containing items they had
already rated, others gave a high feedback to items they had liked in the past,
and others simply stated that they would take the item again if their friends
did not take it. This means that not every user might reject recommendations
containing items already rated or always accept them. Therefore, we believe
that agents should take this aspect into account during the negotiation.
The Already-Rated Punishment (ARP) strategy is proposed as a way to
model the user behavior explained above. ARP works as follows: when an
agent agi is asked by another agent agk about its utility regarding a proposal
xk (made by agk), agi rst uses its utility function to assess xk, and then
applies the ARP strategy to compute a penalty to be applied before the utility
is reported. This way, ARP can indirectly inuence agk decision with respect to
its next proposal (assuming that agk concession strategy is not egocentric, i.e.
it cares about other agents' opinions). The penalty is also taken into account
when the agent decides whether to accept a proposal, and thus proposals that
received a higher penalty will be less likely to be accepted. Depending on the
ARP strategy variant used by agi (which is determined by its associated user),
the utility reported to agk will vary. At the moment MAGReS supports ve
variants for the ARP strategy, but other variants can be included in the future.
These ve variants are the following:
 Easy-Going: No penalty is applied (the penalty is zero), the agent does
not care about receiving proposals with an item already rated by its user.
 Flexible: The penalty is computed as penalty = 1 − flexibilityLevel,
where exibilityLevel (f ) is a value between 0 and 1 and it models how
exible the user is with regard to receiving recommendations of items she
has already rated. The higher the exibility is, the lower the penalty
should be. For example: if flexibilityLevel = 0.75 and the rating given
by the user4 is 0.8, the penalty is computed as penalty = 1− 0.75 = 0.25
therefore the reported utility is 0.8− 0.25 = 0.55.
 Min-Satisfaction: The penalty is 0 (zero) if the rating given by the user
exceeds the minSatisfaction (ms) value set5, otherwise the penalty is the
whole utility value which would result on the agent reporting an utility of
0 for the proposal (meaning that she would not accept a recommendation
4According to Equation 2 the utility is the same as the rating given by the user.
5Both the exibilityLevel and theminSatisfaction of the variants Flexible, Min-Satisfaction
and Flexible Plus can be either set explicitly by the user or learnt by using Machine Learning
techniques.
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with that item). For example, let us suppose minSatisfaction = 0.6,
then if the rating given by the user is 0.5 the reported utility will be 0,
but if the rating given is 0.65 then the agent will report 0.65 as the utility
value of the proposal.
 Flexible Plus: It is a combination of the Flexible and Min-Satisfaction
strategies. Firstly, it computes the penalty in the same way the Flexible
strategy does. Then, if the rating given by the user surpasses the minSat-
isfaction value set, the penalty is divided by two, otherwise the penalty is
not modied.
 Taboo: As the users prefer not to receive recommendations with items
already rated, the penalty for proposals containing those items will be
equal to the utility value dened by the agent's utility function (according
to Equation 2, it corresponds to the rating given by the user to the item),
and therefore, the utility reported by the agent for those proposals will be
0.
Depending on the domain, some variants could produce better results than oth-
ers. For example, the Easy-Going variant could be useful in the music and
restaurant recommendation domains, as users do not tend to reject recommen-
dations containing items they have already consumed. The Min-Satisfaction
variant could be useful in other domains, like books, food, movies and music,
where users would not mind to consume again an item they liked. Finally, the
Taboo variant can be useful in mostly all domains, but especially in those where
the activity of consuming an item (e.g., watching a movie, or traveling to a
certain location) requires a signicant amount of eort, time or resources (e.g.,
money).
3.5. Proposals Acceptance strategy
Not all the users follow the same criteria (nor use the same strategy) when
deciding whether to accept a proposal from others, and the same is valid for
the agents. Depending on the criteria used by the users (group members), one
proposal can be acceptable or not. This aspect was not taken into account in
our previous work, where the Multilateral Agreement Criterion determined that
a proposal is accepted by an agent if it is better than its current one. While for
some users a proposal might not be acceptable because it is not strictly better
than their current proposals; for others, the proposal might be good enough
and therefore acceptable, although not being strictly better. This way, if all the
agents were to use the same acceptance strategy, many potential agreements
would be discarded. Moreover, even if all the agents were to use the same
strategy, a strict strategy might not be always ideal to model their associated
users.
Let us come back to the example presented in Figure 4 and suppose that in
between rounds 2 (Figure 4b) and k (Figure 4c) there is a round i depicted by
Figure 5. In such a case, according to the Multilateral Agreement Criterion, no
agreement was reached. Interestingly, if we look closely, one of the proposals
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(M71 ) could be considered as good enough to have an agreement, because it is
better than what ag1 and ag2 proposed and it is almost as good as the current
proposal of ag3. If all the agents use a strict criterion, M71 is not considered as
an agreement, the negotiation will carry on and will later end with an agreement
on M46 (see Figure 4c), which does not satisfy the users as much as M71 does.
This situation might be dierent if each agent, and particularly ag3, had its own
acceptance criteria. Not only the negotiation would have nished earlier, but
also the quality of the recommendation would have been higher (because the
satisfaction of each group member would have increased). Along this line, we
propose the Proposal Acceptance (PrA) strategy as a way to introduce a user
decision criterion into the agent model.
The PrA strategy currently has three variants, but others can be dened so
as to improve the model. These three variants are the following:
 Strict: The standard denition of multi-lateral agreement is used6. An
agent agi will accept a proposal xk if it is at least as good (in terms of
utility value) as its own proposal (see Equation 4).
accept(agi, xk) = true iff Ui(xk) ≥ Ui(xi) (4)
 Relaxed: An agent accepts a proposal xk if it is as good as its own proposal
or very close to what she wants. Equation 5 depicts the formalization of
this strategy, where relaxPercentage (rp) can assume values in the [0, 0.2]
range7. Each agent might have a dierent rp, which is determined by the
represented user, depending on her own criteria8.
accept(agi, xk) = true iff Ui(xk) ≥ Ui(xi) ∗ (1− relaxPercentage)
(5)
 Next: A proposal xk is accepted if it is better than the agent's next
proposal (i.e. the one it would make if it had to concede in the next round).
This strategy is similar to the one used by the agents in the single-issue
negotiation model proposed in [41], in which an agent accepts an oer if
its utility is higher than that of the agent counter-oer. It works under the
following assumption: if I reject proposal xk, which is not better than my
current proposal xi but better than my next one (xi+1), and as a result
the round ends with no agreement, I am forced to make a concession and
my next proposal is accepted, then I would have lost some utility because
I rejected proposal xk that was better than my next one (see Equation 6).
accept(agi, xk) = true iff Ui(xk) ≥ Ui(xi+1) (6)
where xi+1 is agi next proposal
6This is the one used by all agents in [12].
7The upper limit of the range was determined empirically.
8This value can be set explicitly by the user, or learnt automatically by using Machine
Learning techniques over user feedback, among other options.
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Figure 5: Example of potential agreement, discarded due to a strict criterion (Round i, with
2<i<k).
3.6. Information privacy
Not every user will be comfortable with her private information being shared,
made public or exposed in any way [5]. In the recommendation area, the amount
and type of information that every user needs to reveal about herself, so as to
allow the recommender system to produce a recommendation for her, depends
on the approach used to make the recommendations. For example, when using
a traditional approach based on preference aggregation, the system will require
the user to inform about all her preferences. This is another advantage of using
a multi-agent approach like MAGReS: the agents can control the amount of
information that needs to be revealed during the recommendation process. For
example, the only information about the user preferences being revealed is the
one related to: (i) the proposals the agent makes, and (ii) the utility values she
reports when asked if she is willing to accept a proposal made by another agent.
This way, MAGReS is expected to be more respectful of the information privacy
(i.e. by leaking less users' private information) than a traditional approach.
4. Evaluation
In this section we describe the experiments carried out to evaluate our ap-
proach for group recommendation in two domains: movies and points of interest
(POI). In Section 4.1 we describe the datasets used. In Section 4.2 we establish
the algorithms considered as baselines. In Section 4.3 we dene the evaluation
criteria. In Section 4.4 we describe the objectives of our experiments and ex-
plain some aspects of their design, such as the parameters taken into account
and their values. At last, in Section 4.5 we discuss the results obtained.
4.1. Datasets
Two datasets were used to evaluate our approach: the rst one in the movies
domain and the second one in the POI domain. In both cases, we randomly
sampled 180 users (without repetition) and created 45 groups of 3, 4 and 5
people (15 groups per size). The two datasets are described below.
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 Movies: we used the popular MovieLens9 dataset with ratings of users
for dierent movies to generate user groups of varying sizes. In particular,
the experiments were performed withMovieLensLatestSmall that contains
100, 000 ratings, 700 users and 9, 000 movies. We will refer to this dataset
as ML_LATEST_SMALL.
 POI: we used a dataset from the Yelp Dataset Challenge10 that contains
check-ins (visits of users to places) from various cities in the world. For
the purpose of the experiments we only considered those check-ins belong-
ing to Arizona (US), since the resulting network is dense. Also, we only
considered those users having at least 9 check-ins. The resulting dataset
contains 19, 193 users. Regarding the distribution of check-ins, the dataset
contains 497, 029 check-ins in 85, 901 POIs generated by the selected users.
We will refer to this dataset as YELP.
4.2. Description of baselines
We compared the recommendations resulting from traditional group rec-
ommendation against those produced by MAGReS. As the baseline for this
comparison, we implemented two recommender systems that rely on traditional
approaches, namely:
 TRADGRec-PA: a GRS that uses preference aggregation, as proposed in
[20, 42].
 TRADGRec-RA: a GRS that relies on the aggregation of recommenda-
tions produced for each group member. It is based on the approach pro-
posed in [42](chapter 2, section 2.4), which generates a recommendation
containing k items for each group member and then merges all those rec-
ommendations into a single recommendation (the group recommendation).
For this matter, the group preference (or rating) of each candidate (i.e.,
an item recommended to a group member) is computed by aggregating
the preferences (either existing or predicted ones) of each group member
over the candidate, and then the k candidates with the highest group
preference values are selected to be part of the group recommendation.
For MAGReS, we also implemented a protocol known as the One-Step proto-
col [43] as an additional baseline. The One-Step protocol is a variant of MCP
in which all the negotiations happen in one single round. The agents simply
interchange their proposals (one proposal each) and seek for an agreement, but
there is no concession.
The single-user recommender (SUR) system used by the agents in MA-




framework11 and the Mahout framework12. Duine was used in the rst imple-
mentation stages and helped us to gain condence that the approach was vi-
able [44, 12]. Nonetheless, Duine had some limitations regarding the loading
time of the data models, which made it unsuitable for a responsive recommen-
dation application13. Therefore, all the tests in this article were made using the
Mahout-based implementation, which uses a CF-based (Collaborative Filtering)
approach. In the framework, both item-centered CF (ICF) and user-centered
CF (UCF) ltering are supported, and thus we implemented two variants of the
SUR, one using ICF and another one using UCF.
4.3. Evaluation criteria
4.3.1. Satisfaction
The satisfaction of the recommendations for the users were measured in
terms of several indicators. These indicators can be computed both at the
item- (i.e., an item recommended) and recommendation- (i.e., a list of items
recommended) levels. These indicators are the following:
 group satisfaction (Sg or GS): it measures the satisfaction of the group
with respect to an item (or a list of items) being recommended. The
satisfaction is equivalent to the estimated preference (or rating) of the
user/group with respect to the item.
 item level: the group satisfaction for an item xj is computed as ex-
plained in Equation 9, where n is the number of group members (| g |)
in the group (g) and Si(xj) is the satisfaction of group member ui
over item xj . Si(xj) is computed as the rating for the pair < ui, xj >
predicted by the SUR by using the rating prediction CF formula14
and the similarity metric chosen for each experiment.





 recommendation level: the GS of a recommendation r consisting of
k items (r =< x, x2, ..., xk >) is computed as the average of the GS
11http://duineframework.org/
12http://mahout.apache.org/
13For example, Duine needed around 30 seconds to load the data models when using the
MovieLens100k dataset, while Mahout only needed 2 seconds to perform the same task.
14The way a rating rui,xj is predicted depends on whether the SUR uses ICF (see Equation 7)
or UCF (see Equation 8).
rui,xj = ¯rxj +
∑
(rui,xk − ¯rxk ) × Similarity(xj , xk)∑ | Similarity(xj , xk) |
(7)
rui,xj = ¯rui +
∑
(ruk,xj − ¯ruk ) × Similarity(ui, uk)∑ | Similarity(ui, uk) |
(8)
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of every item in r (see Equation 10).





 members satisfaction dispersion (MSD): it assesses how uniformly
the group members are satised by either a single item xj or a recommen-
dation r. The lower the MSD is the more uniformly satised the group
members will be.
 item level: as it can be seen in Equation 11, the MSD for an item xj







 recommendation level: the MSD for a recommendation r that con-
sists of k items (r =< x1, x2, ..., xk>) is computed as the average of






 fairness: it is a metric proposed in [45] for evaluating a recommendation
of an item (xj) to a group. It is dened as the percentage of group members
satised by the recommendation (see Equation 13). To determine which
users are satised, the authors set a threshold th to 3.5 stars (out of 5 stars,
the equivalent to 0.7 out of 1) and any group member with a satisfaction
value above the threshold is considered satised. We kept th = 0.7 and
extended this metric for applying it to a recommendation r of k items.
As it can be seen in Equation 14, the fairness of a recommendation r of k
items is computed as the average of the fairness of the items.
fairness(g, xj) =









Another factor that needs to be taken into consideration is the amount of
user information that gets leaked during the recommendation process. This
information is mainly related to: (i) the utility function held by the user (i.e.
the way she computes the ratings for the items) and (ii) the items she can
propose during a negotiation (i.e. her candidate proposals). This way, given
two recommendation approaches R1 and R2, we consider that R1 produces
better recommendations (than R2) in terms of information privacy if it leaks
less information while producing the recommendations.
To measure the amount of information revealed by UserAgents of MAGReS
we computed two , namely: UFIL and PIL.
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 Utility Function Information Leak (UFIL): it measures (in a [0; 1]
range) the amount of information revealed with regard to the user utility
function of user ui, either when recommending a single item xj or a list
of items r =< x1, x2, ..., xk >.
(i) MAGReS: in this case UFIL measures the amount of information
related to the utility function that is revealed by agent agi (which
represents user ui). At the item-level, we use Equation 15 for agent
ai recommending item xj . For a list of items (or recommendation),
we use Equation 16.
UFIL(ui, xj) = UFIL(agi, xj) =
| itemsWithUtilityRevealed(agi, xj) |
| itemsTotal(agi) |
(15)
where | itemsWithUtilityRevealed(agi, xj) | is the amount of items
for whom agi has revealed its utility (or satisfaction) value when item
xj was recommended; and | itemsTotal(agi) | is the total amount of






(ii) TRADGRec-PA: given that TRADGRec-PA uses a traditional ap-
proach based on preference aggregation, it requires the system to
know everything related to the user preferences. Thus, UFIL(ui, xj)
is always set to 1.
(iii) TRADGRec-RA: it uses a traditional approach based on recommen-
dation aggregation where the candidate items are selected by us-
ing preference aggregation (the k candidates with the highest group
preference value are selected). Thus, it requires the system to know
everything related to the user preferences. Again, UFIL(ui, xj) is
always set to 1.
 Proposals Information Leak (PIL, MAGReS only): it represents
the proportion (measured in a [0; 1] range) of candidate proposals that the
agent (agi) revealed during the negotiation process with regard to all the
proposals it could have made. We use Equation 17 for a single item xj
(i.e., item level), and Equation 18 for a list of items (or recommendation)
r =< x1, x2, ..., xk > (i.e., recommendation level).
PIL(ui, xj) = PIL(agi, xj) =









It is important to notice that the PIL indicator cannot be computed for
TRADGRec-PA and TRADGRec-RA, because the concept of proposal
does not exist in those systems15.
4.4. Experimental setting
The number of recommendations for a ranking was set to k = 3, 5 and 10
items, since they are common amounts of recommendations (top-three, top-ve
and top-ten). In the case of MCP (either one-step or multi-step variants), we
run the protocol k times, in order to produce the k recommendations. For a
given run, we removed from the negotiation space those items that were agreed
by all the agents in the previous run.
For all the approaches we conducted experiments with several congura-
tions using both user and item-based recommendation techniques (and dierent
similarity metrics for each one). Mahout allows to use user-based (UB) and
item-based (IB) SURs. As it can be seen in Appendix A.1, depending on the
type of SUR, dierent similarity functions are available. In summary, we exer-
cised the three approaches below:
 TRADGRec-PA: it has a single parameter, which is the preference ag-
gregation strategy used for computing the group preferences (aggregated
preferences) when building the group preference prole. We used ve ag-
gregation strategies: average (AVG), least misery (LM), most pleasure
(MP), approval voting (AV) and upward leveling (UL) [7, 20, 42, 46].
The parameters (if any) of each aggregation strategy are discussed in Ap-
pendix A.3.1.
 TRADGRec-RA: it has a single parameter that can be congured, which
is the aggregation strategy used for computing the group preferences (ag-
gregated preferences) during the process of selecting the candidate rec-
ommended items . We used the same four aggregation strategies as in
TRADGRec-PA.
 MAGReS: we tested with both the One-Step and MCP protocols. For
each of them, we tested three Concession strategies (Desires Distance,
Nash and Utilitarian), the ve ARP strategies (see Section 3.4) and all
the Proposal Acceptance strategies (see Section 3.5). Despite the variety
of parameters that can be tuned, based on the tests we performed, none
of them produced a signicant impact on the resulting recommendation
nor on its quality.
It is important to note that for all the tests of Sections 4.5.1, 4.5.2, 4.5.3, and
4.5.4 we set the amount of items to be recommended (k) up to 10 (i.e., k = 10).
Once the results of the tests showed the eectiveness of our approach when
15For the sake of comparisons, we could assume PIL = 1 for the same reasons we set UFIL
to 1, but we decided not to compare MAGReS against TRADGRec-PA and TRADGRec-RA
with respect to the PIL.
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making recommendations of 10 items, we conducted tests with a lower amount
of items. A summary of the results for the experiments with k = 3 and k = 5
can be found in Section 4.5.5.
4.5. Experiments
Given the variety of parameters that can be tweaked within the approach,
we decided to report the analysis over those that would have a high impact on
both the recommendation process and the recommendations. These parameters
are the following:
1. The type of SUR, and especially the type of similarity metric.
We tested both types of SUR, the user-based and the item-based ones. For
the user-based SUR, we conducted experiments with the following similar-
ity metrics: City Block, Euclidean Distance, Log Likelihood, Pearson Cor-
relation and Uncentered Cosine. For the item-based SUR, we conducted
tests with the City Block, Euclidean Distance, Pearson Correlation and
Uncentered Cosine.
2. The PrA strategy. In this case we conducted experiments testing all the
variants of the PrA strategy: Strict, Relaxed and Next.
3. The Already Rated Punishment strategy. In this case we run tests us-
ing all the variants of the ARP strategy. Particularly, for the Flexible,
Min-Satisfaction and Flexible Plus variants, we run tests with dierent
parameterizations.
More details about the parameterization of each approach and strategy can be
found in Appendix A.2.2.
4.5.1. Single-User Recommender: User and Item-based
The SUR was one of the factors that aected the most both the recom-
mendation process and the recommendations. During the experimentation, we
observed some peculiar results for certain combinations of SUR and similarity
metrics:
 When using a user-based (UB) SUR, the City Block, Euclidean Distance,
and Uncentered Cosine metrics caused all the recommendations to be
almost the same for both datasets (MovieLens and Yelp) and the 45 groups
(per dataset) involved in the test, both for the traditional (TRADGRec-
PA and TRADGRec-RA) and MAS-based approaches. According to the
results of the tests performed, we believe that the low density of the rating
matrices for the datasets and the size of the neighborhoods selected for
the experiments might have been the reasons for those results, as they
directly aect the eectiveness of most user-based similarity metrics. We
analyzed this issue empirically, but a deeper analysis and tests with larger
datasets is subject of future work.
 When using a item-based (IB) SUR, the improvement observed for MA-
GReS in terms of GS, MSD and fairness, was barely noticeable if the City
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Figure 6: Average group satisfaction (GS) per similarity metric and approach
Block similarity metric was used. The opposite eect was observed when
another similarity metric (like Uncentered Cosine or Pearson Correlation)
was used.
The parameterization used for this experiment is specied in Appendix A.4.1.
As it can be seen in Figures 6, 7 and 8, the recommendations may vary de-
pending on the similarity metric and type of SUR being used. In general we
can see that MAGReS running with the MCP protocol outperformed both the
traditional approaches (TRADGRec-PA and TRADGRec-RA) and MAGReS
running the One-Step protocol. One exception to the rule was the similarity
metric (IB) City Block, in which the combination of the Taboo variant of the
ARP strategy and the Strict variant of the PrA strategy was the reason behind
many recommendations being empty. This situation generated a group satisfac-
tion of zero for all the groups aected (6 in the ML_LATEST_SMALL dataset
and 23 in the YELP dataset) and had a direct impact on the values reported in
Figures 6 and 7.
The results were validated through a statistical analysis. For each dataset
and for each similarity metric, we rst performed a Shappiro-Wilk test to de-
termine if the samples were normal. Given that in most cases there was at least
one sample that did not follow the normal distribution, we performed a pairwise
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test (which is a non-parametric test) so as to compare
each pair of recommendation techniques (for example: MAGReS [One Step;
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Figure 7: Average member satisfaction dispersion (MSD) per similarity metric and approach
Figure 8: Average fairness per similarity metric and approach
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M19] versus MAGReS [MCP Strict; M5] or MAGReS [MCP Relaxed; M17])
versus TRADGRec-PA [AVG; T1]). To do this, we rst used a two-sided test
to determine if both samples were signicantly dierent from one another and
then, if the samples were dierent, we used two one-sided tests to determine
which of the samples was greater or less than the other. For the experiments
in Figure 6 we wanted to test whether one approach, A (e.g., MAGReS [MCP
Strict; M5]), was signicantly better than the other B (e.g., TRADGRec-PA
[AVG; T1]) in terms of GS, so the null hypothesis was the sample of the ap-
proach A is not greater than the sample of the approach B. For the experiments
reported in Figure 7 we wanted to test that one approach A was signicantly
better than the other B in terms of MSD, and therefore the null hypothesis was
the sample of the approach A is not worse than the sample of the approach B.
Finally, for the experiments reported in Figure 8 we wanted to test whether one
approach A was signicantly better than other approach B in terms of fairness,
so the null hypothesis was the sample of the approach A is not greater than
the sample of the approach B. The statistical analysis conrmed our observa-
tions as, in each test, the null hypothesis was rejected at a signicance level of
95% (α = 0.05). Thus, we conrmed that the recommendations generated by
MAGReS, and particularly those generated by MAGReS [MCP Relaxed; M17]
outperformed those of TRADGRec-PA and TRADGRec-RA.
4.5.2. Already Rated Punishment strategy
The ARP strategy was created to model how the user feels about receiving
a recommendation with an item she has already rated. Each variant of the ARP
strategy aects the way the proposals are treated by the agents, both when they
decide about accepting (or refusing) a proposal and about their next proposal,
and this might ultimately reduce the amount of cases in which an item already
rated is recommended to the group. We tested all the strategies using both user
and item-based SURs, and each of them with dierent similarity metrics. The
parameterization used for this experiment is detailed in Appendix A.4.2. At the
moment, all the agents use the same ARP Strategy, but we plan to allow users
to choose their own strategy in their agents in the near future.
Figure 9 shows, per ARP strategy, the average percentage of items recom-
mended (considering the 45 groups per dataset) that were already rated by at
least one of the group members. As it can be seen, the tests revealed that when
using ML_LATEST_SMALL dataset, Taboo is the best-perfoming strategy at
the task of reducing the amount of already-rated items being recommended.
This implies that the desires of the users who chose the Taboo as the ARP
Strategy for their agents are being properly represented and taken into account
during the recommendation process. The tests with the YELP dataset con-
rmed what we observed in the tests with the other dataset, but also showed
that when a user-based similarity metric was used the overlap was close to
zero even when using the other ARP strategies. This may be explained by
the amount of items in the dataset (as the POI dataset has almost 10 times
more items than the movies dataset) and the amount of items rated by each
user (a minimum of 9 items per user in YELP dataset, and a minimum of 20
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Figure 9: Average overlap percentage per similarity metric and ARP strategy.
in ML_LATEST_SMALL), which reduces the probability of occurrence of the
overlaps.
In Figure 9 we also observed that using Min-Satisfaction with the min-
satisfaction parameter set to 0.6 (equivalent to 3 of 5 stars) is almost the same
as using Easy-Going in terms of both group satisfaction and percentage of over-
lap. This means that even when the agents are not penalizing proposals with
less than 3 stars, since they are using the Easy-Going strategy that constraint is
being maintained implicitly. Finally, we observed that Flexible Plus seems to be
a good point in between an aggressive strategy like Taboo and a relaxed strategy
like Easy-Going, helping to discard items (e.g., movies) the user will not like
but still recommending those she will be willing to consume again (e.g., movies
the user will be willing to watch again). The use of the ARP strategies has a
side-eect on the group satisfaction value: the more restrictive the strategy is,
the lower the group satisfaction is. The reason behind this observation is that
when users (and therefore, their agents) do not complain (by penalizing the
utility reported) about receiving proposals with items they have already rated
(i.e. when the Easy-Going strategy is used), it is more likely that the recommen-
dations contain items that received high ratings by the group members, which
then increases the group satisfaction value (see Figure 10). This way, Easy-
Going produces the best recommendations in terms of group satisfaction, but
the worst one in terms of the overlap , and Taboo produces recommendations
with less overlap but also with an slightly lower value of group satisfaction.
With regard to the MSD and fairness (see Figures 11 and 12) of the rec-
ommendations, the results vary depending on the dataset. For the dataset
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Figure 10: Average group satisfaction per similarity metric and ARP strategy.
ML_LATEST_SMALL, we can say that Taboo is the best ARP strategy with
regard to MSD but Min-Satisfaction (with the ms parameter set to 0.6) is the
best with regard to fairness. For YELP, Taboo is the best with regard to the
fairness but there is not a clear winner regarding to the MSD. Overall, and in-
dependently of the dataset, we would choose Taboo as a default strategy (until
the user chooses the strategy that better suits her personality) as, in most cases,
it ensures the minimization of the overlap.
All the results were validated through statistical tests. We rst run the
Shappiro-Wilk test on the samples to determine whether they followed or not
the normal distribution. Given that some of the samples did not follow that
distribution a non-parametric test was used. We then proceeded like we did
previously (see Section 4.5.1): by performing (for each dataset and for each
similarity metric) a pair-wise comparisons among the 5 samples (one for each
ARP variant) using the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test. For Figures 9 and 11 the
null hypothesis was the sample of the variant A is not worse than the sample
of the variant B , as we wanted to test that one ARP variant A (e.g., Taboo)
was signicantly better than the other B (e.g., Easy-Going) in terms of the
amount of overlap (Figure 9)/MSD (Figure 11). In the case of the Figures 10
and 12 the null hypothesis was the sample of the variant A is not greater than
the sample of the variant B . The test results conrmed our observations as, in
each test, the null hypothesis was rejected at a signicance level of 95%. Thus,
we conrmed that the variants of the ARP proposed in this article helped to
reduce the overlap in the recommendations, but at the cost of causing a minor
loss in their quality.
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Figure 11: Average MSD per similarity metric depending on the ARP strategy used by all the
group members
Figure 12: Average fairness per similarity metric depending on the ARP strategy used by all
the group members
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Figure 13: Average amount of concessions to generate a recommendation of k = 10 items
depending on the PrA strategy
4.5.3. Proposals Acceptance strategy
In addition to the (existing) Strict variant, we proposed two more strategies,
namely: Relaxed and Next. Although the usage of the PrA strategy is merely
dedicated to model acceptance criteria for user's proposals, we will compare the
dierent variants of the strategy according to how they aect recommendation
process and results. By denition, the Relaxed and Next variants of the PrA
strategy cause, in some way, the agents to be more exible when deciding
whether to accept a proposal. This situation has the following consequences:
1. It helps the agents to reach agreements faster and therefore produce rec-
ommendations faster. Given that the agents are more relaxed when as-
sessing proposals and deciding whether to accept them , less concessions
are needed to reach an agreement and the number of rounds of negotia-
tion consequently decreases. As it can be seen in Figure 13 there are some
exceptions to the rule, for example for ML_LATEST_SMALL when the
(IB) City Block similarity metric is used, and for YELP when the (IB)
Euclidean Weighted similarity metric was used. In both cases the increase
in the number of concessions when using the strategies Relaxed and Next
can be explained by the dierence in the GS of the recommendations pro-
duced when those PrA strategies were used.
2. It might increase the group satisfaction for certain congurations of groups
and strategies (see Figure 14). This situation is highly dependent on the
strategy followed by the agents to select their initial proposal and the Con-
cession strategies. For the experiments we used the Egocentric [13] (the
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initial proposal is the one that retains the highest utility value) and De-
sires Distance strategies respectively. In this context, each agent´s initial
proposal is its best one in terms of utility (and therefore user satisfaction)
and every time the agent has to concede it makes a new proposal with
lower utility than its current one. Then, the more concessions we have,
the lower the user satisfaction will be. Moreover, each concession low-
ers the agent's requirements for accepting proposals and increases the
probability of reaching an agreement. This way, the more concessions the
agent makes, the lower its utility becomes, and therefore the lower the
satisfaction of the corresponding user will be.
Figure 14: Average group satisfaction (GS) depending on the PrA strategy
3. It might increase the amount of eective recommendations produced by
the recommender to each group, specially when the similarity metric is
an item-based one (see Figure 16). This is more noticeable when all the
agents use a more relaxed PrA strategy (like Next or Relaxed) and the
similarity metric is an item-based one. In fact, as expected, the less strict
the agent is when determining whether to accept or reject proposals, the
higher the amount of eective recommendations is. The explanation for
this is simple: if the agents are more prone to accepting proposals, more
negotiations will end with an agreement and therefore more items will be
recommended to the group.
The parameterization used for this experiment is specied in Appendix A.4.3.
We have tested the strategies with dierent similarity metrics and ARP strate-
gies, while keeping the Initial Proposal and Concession strategies xed (to Ego-
centric and Desires Distance respectively). At the moment, all the agents use
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Figure 15: Average member satisfaction dispersion (MSD) depending on the Proposals Ac-
ceptance PrA strategy used by all the group members
Figure 16: Average amount of eective recommendations depending on the PrA strategy
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the same PrA Strategy, but we plan to allow users to choose their own strategy
in their agents in the near future. Figures 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 show the re-
sults for the test with the Taboo ARP strategy and the most relevant similarity
metrics.
Figure 13 shows that, as expected, the total amount of concessions decreases
drastically when using the Relaxed [rp=0.1] variant with respect to the Strict
variant (which was the one used by PUMAS in [12]), and the rest of the variants
are in between those mentioned.
In Figure 14 we see that group satisfaction for the Relaxed and Next variants
did not increase as much as we expected. The results of the experiments with
ML_LATEST_SMALL show the GS increased for all the similarity metrics.
However, the experiments performed with YELP show that the GS only im-
proved when an IB similarity metric was used. A possible explanation is that
the Relaxed and Next variants of the PrA strategy assume that, in some cases,
it might be preferable to accept a proposal x (even if it is not exactly better
than the agent current proposal but it is close enough), rather than risking to
let the agent concede (which will cause an utility loss perhaps higher than the
one incurred by accepting proposal x). As a result, the agents accept more pro-
posals, the agreement is reached faster and less concessions are made. Although
this might be positive in some cases, there is a cost to pay: even if a proposal
x is rejected, the agent might never be forced to concede and, in such a case,
accepting x was a bad choice as it generated a utility loss that rejecting x would
not have caused.
In Figure 15 we see that, in some cases the MSD decreases as the relax level
increases (when using the Relaxed variant) but this is not always true. This
eects follows from what we explained previously about the possible increase
in group satisfaction, but only in those cases on which the utility of the initial
proposal of the agents is very similar and/or the same. Additionally, we can
observe that the Next variant negatively impacted on how uniformly the group
members were satised (by increasing the MSD), and once again, the explana-
tion is the same as the one given above: the assumption that Next makes might
lead the agents to make sub-optimal decisions.
Figure 16 shows that, as expected, when all the agents use the Strict variant
the amount of eective recommendations (i.e recommendations produced) is
lower than when they use the Relaxed or Next variants.
In Figure 17 we can see that the fairness of the recommendations increases
in most cases when the Relaxed and Next strategies are used. All the results
were validated through statistical tests. We rst run the Shappiro-Wilk test on
the samples to determine whether they followed or not the normal distribution.
Given that some of the samples did not follow that distribution a non-parametric
test was used. We then proceeded like we did previously (see Section 4.5.1): by
performing (for each dataset and for each similarity metric) a pair-wise com-
parisons among the 5 samples (one for each PrA variant) using the Wilcoxon
Signed Ranks test:
 For Figures 13 and 15, the null hypothesis was dened as the sample of
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Figure 17: Average fairness per similarity metric depending on the PrA Strategy
the variant A is not worse than the sample of the variant B  as we wanted
to test that one PrA strategy A (e.g., Strict) was signicantly better than
the other B (e.g., Next) in terms of amount of concessions made by the
agents (Figure 13)/MSD (Figure 15).
 For Figures 14, 16 and 17, we tested that one PrA strategy A (e.g., Re-
laxed [rp=0.05]) was signicantly better than the other B (e.g., Relaxed
[rp=0.025]) regarding to the GS (Figure 14)/amount of eective recom-
mendations (Figure 16)/fairness (Figure 17), so null hypothesis was the
sample of the variant A is not greater than the sample of the variant B .
All the previous tests conrmed our observations as, in each test, the null hy-
pothesis was rejected at a signicance level of 95% (α = 0.05). Thus, we con-
rmed that PrA Relaxed was the best one with regard to reducing the amount of
concessions required for the agents to reach an agreement, and also to increasing
the items recommended, while keeping the quality of the recommendations.
4.5.4. Information privacy
In order to measure the amount of information revealed by UserAgent's of
MAGReS during the negotiation process, the UFIL and PIL indicators were
computed (see Section 4.3).
The parameterization used for this experiment is specied in Appendix A.4.4.
As it can be seen in Figure 18, the amount of information related to the utility
function that was leaked when using MAGReS is always lower than when using
the traditional approaches (the preference aggregation one, TRADGRec-PA,
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Figure 18: Information Leak: Utility Function related information
and the recommendation aggregation one, TRADGRec-RA). Logically, when
using MAGReS [One-Step; M19], MAGReS [MCP Next; M11] and MAGReS
[MCP Relaxed; M17], the amount of information leaked is always lower than
when using the MAGReS [MCP Strict; M5], as MAGReS [One-Step; M19] only
uses one negotiation round and both MAGReS [MCP Next; M11] and MAGReS
[MCP Relaxed; M17] reduce the amount negotiation rounds by making the
agents reach agreements faster (see Sections 3.5 and 4.5.3). The same conclusion
was reached when analyzing the amount of information leaked regarding the
candidate proposals. We found out that, again, MAGReS [One-Step; M19],
MAGReS [MCP Next; M11] andMAGReS [MCP Relaxed; M17] variants always
leak less information than the MAGReS [MCP Strict; M5] one. All in all, the
best variant out of the four tested seems to beMAGReS [MCP Relaxed; M17], as
it leaks a reasonable amount of information while achieving, in many cases, the
highest GS, fairness and amount of eective recommendations, and the lowest
MSD (see Section 4.5.3).
To conrm the validity of the results, we run statistical tests following the
same strategy as the one used in previous sections. For each dataset and for
each similarity metric we rst performed a normality test and then, when we
conrmed that at least one of the samples did not follow the normal distribution,
we performed a pair-wise comparison among the samples (5 in Figure 18 and
4 in Figure 19) using the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test. As one approach, A, is
better than another one, B, if it leaks less information with regard to the utility
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Figure 19: Information Leak: Candidate proposals related information
function (Figure 18) and the candidate proposals of each agent (Figure 19), for
each test we dened the null hypothesis as the sample of the variant A is not
worse than the sample of the variant B. The results of the test conrmed our
ndings as, in each test, the null hypothesis was rejected at a signicance level
of 95% (α = 0.05). At last, we conrmed that MAGReS leaked less information
than TRADGRec-PA and TRADGRec-PA with respect to the users' utility
function, and that, with the exception of MAGReS [One-Step; M19], MAGReS
[MCP; M17]was also the parameterization that fewer proposals revealed.
4.5.5. Smaller size recommendations (K=3 and K=5)
Once we determined that MAGReS was capable of producing better rec-
ommendations than TRADGRec-RA and TRADGRec-PA when the amount of
items to be recommended was 10, we wanted to know if the same situation would
happen when making smaller recommendations (i.e., with less items). For this
matter, we replicated the tests performed for k = 10 (see Section 4.4) but just
using the similarity metrics that provided the best results in terms of the quality
of the recommendations produced: Euclidean Distance similarity for the item-
based SUR and Pearson Similarity for the user-based SUR. The results of the
experiments conducted showed that for both k = 3 and k = 5 MAGReS out-
performed the traditional approaches (TRADGRec-PA and TRADGRec-RA)
in terms of:
 The GS and the MSD of her recommendations. As it can be seen in Fig-
ure 20 and Figure 21 the recommendations produced by all the variants of
MAGReS not only achieved a higher level of satisfaction for the group (i.e.,
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the GS) but also were able to satisfy all of its members more uniformly
(i.e., the MSD was lower) and increased the fairness of the recommenda-
tions.
 The amount of information leaked. As it can be seen in Figure 22, in the
worst case scenario (when using Taboo as the ARP strategy and Strict as
the PrA strategy) MAGReS leaked less utility-function related informa-
tion than TRADGRec-PA and TRADGRec-RA . Regarding the leak of
proposals related information we found out that, as it happened when we
set k = 10 (see Section 4.5.4), in the worst case scenario the MCP-based
variant of MAGReS leaked no more than the 0.33% (for the experiments
with ML_LATEST_SMALL)/0.01% (for the experiments with YELP)
of the information, which means that over all the items present in the
datasets (see Section 4.4), just the 0.33% (ML_LATEST_SMALL) and
0.01% (YELP) of them was eectively proposed by every agent during
each one the recommendations. Note that the amount of information (of
all types) leaked was signicantly lower than when making recommenda-
tions of 10 items, and this is explained because a lower amount of items
to be recommended implies a lower amount of negotiation processes to be
carried out (see Section 4.4), which leads to less information leaked by the
agents.
With regard to the analysis of the ARP and PrA strategies, the tests proved
that the observations made in the analysis for k = 10 were also valid for k = 3
and k = 5:
 The use of the ARP strategies reduced signicantly the amount of al-
ready rated items being recommended. The Taboo variant was able to
completely eliminate the overlap for both of the similarity metrics, while
not producing a signicant negative impact in the quality of the recom-
mendation.
 The PrA strategies helped to increase the group satisfaction while also
increasing the amount of eective recommendations,reducing the amount
of concessions needed to reach the end of the negotiation (either with an
agreement or a conict), increasing the fairness of the recommendations
and, in some cases, reducing the MSD.
4.5.6. Summary of results
The ARP strategy was created in order to model, as an agent-like behav-
ior, how the user feels about receiving a recommendation with an item she/he
has already rated. The ARP strategy works as a penalty to the utility re-
ported by the agent when asked about a certain proposal. Each variant of the
ARP strategy has its own rules for computing the penalty. From all the vari-
ants of the ARP strategy, our tests showed that, independently the dataset
used, Taboo was the most eective variant at the task of reducing (to zero
in most of the cases) the overlap between items recommended and items al-
ready rated by the group members, but this came at the cost of reducing
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(a) Average GS per similarity metric and approach
(b) Average MSD per similarity metric and approach
(c) Average fairness per similarity metric and approach
Figure 20: Average GS, MSD and fairness for recommendations of size 3 (k = 3)
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(a) Average GS per similarity metric and approach
(b) Average MSD per similarity metric and approach
(c) Average fairness per similarity metric and approach
Figure 21: Average GS, MSD and fairness for recommendations of size 5 (k = 5)
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(a) Utility Function related information
(b) Proposals related information
Figure 22: Information leak for recommendations of size 3 (k = 3)
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the group satisfaction. The Flexible variant, on the other side, provided a
good reduction of overlap/group satisfaction loss ratio, particularly when the
flexibilityLevel (f) parameter was set to 0.75. In this case, the tests showed
that, for both datasets, the overlap was reduced to almost a 1% overall except
in the case of the similarity metric (IB) City Block, for which the overlap was
around 11% in the experiments performed with ML_LATEST_SMALL and
2% in those performed with YELP. Additionally, the group satisfaction loss was
generally lower than when using the Taboo variant. With regard to the fairness,
theMin-Satisfaction (for ML_LATEST_SMALL) and Easy-Going (for YELP)
variants seem to perform the best but, due to the how those variants work, the
overlap is high. All in all, depending on which ARP strategy is selected by the
group members for their agents, the group recommendation will change.
The PrA strategy was introduced as a way to improve the model of users
criteria with regards to the decision of accepting a proposal. Three dierent
variants were proposed, namely: Strict (originally proposed in [12]), Relaxed
and Next. For our tests we dened scenarios where all the agents used the same
PrA strategy, so as to analyze the eects of each strategy on the recommenda-
tions. We observed that, independently the dataset used, when all the agents
used the Strict variant the amount of eective recommendations was lower than
when they used either the Next or the Relaxed variants. This was caused by the
amount of negotiations that ended up with no agreement (i.e., with conict),
as many proposals were rejected because of not being exactly what the agents
were expecting. Naturally, when the agents are more exible when determining
whether to accept or not a proposal, they are more prone to accept proposals
that are not exactly what they wanted but that are good enough, and so the
amount of eective recommendations increases. In terms of the quality of the
recommendations measured by the group satisfaction and how uniformly where
the group members satised, we observed that when the Relaxed variant was
used there were some improvements (if compared to the Strict variant), but
when the Next variant was used the quality of the recommendations produced
was lower (due to the the sub-optimal decisions taken by the agents). Addi-
tionally, we observed that the use of the variants Relaxed and Next helped to
improve the fairness of the recommendations regardless of the dataset used.
Finally, regarding to the framework that supports the approach, we have
also added support for the use of Mahout-based SURs as they were faster than
the Duine-based SURs for both loading the data models and generating the
recommendations. The similarity metrics available depended on the type of SUR
used. The tests revealed that some of them were not able to produce reliable
recommendations (for example, City Block and Euclidean Distance similarities
for the user-based SUR) and therefore have to be treated with care.
The main insights from the experiments were the following:
 The Relaxed variant of the PrA strategy can be considered as the ideal
variant, as it not only helps to increase the number of recommended items
but also reduces the number of concessions, without negatively impacting
on the quality of the recommendations.
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 Out of all the variants of the ARP strategy, Taboo performed the best at
the task of preventing MAGReS from recommending items already rated
by the group members. On the downside, this variant might decrease the
quality of the recommendations , but overall it is still good enough. With
this consideration in mind, we would recommended that all the agents use
this strategy by default, unless their users decide to manually change it.In
terms of performance, the One-Step protocol allowed MAGReS to make
faster recommendations, when compared to the MCP , but this came at
the cost of drops in the recommendation quality.
 MCP, in turn, helped to improve the quality of the recommendations by
increasing the group satisfaction and also satisfying all the group members
more uniformly.
 With regard to the SUR, we noticed that the best recommendations were
generated when using the Euclidean Distance similarity for the item-based
SUR and the Pearson Similarity for the user-based SUR.
5. Conclusions and Future Work
In this article we proposed MAGReS, a group recommendation approach
based on MAS as an alternative to the traditional approaches, which employ
a combination between aggregation techniques and SUR techniques to produce
group recommendations. In MAGReS, on the contrary, the agents act on behalf
of the users, protecting their interests and representing them in a negotiation
process that mimics the way humans negotiate about a certain topic. The results
of the experiments showed that the use of negotiation instead of the aggregation
techniques can greatly improve the quality of the recommendations, not only
increasing the level of satisfaction of the group as a whole (group satisfaction)
but also satisfying the group members more uniformly (i.e. by reducing MSD
and increasing fairness). Along this line, the inclusion of the ARP and PrA
strategies had an impact on the the recommendations produced and allows
the users to personalize the behavior of the agents representing them in the
recommendation process.
Although we obtained satisfactory results, our experimental study has some
limitations. First, the user groups were selected randomly from the dataset,
and so we ignored any potential relationships of group members. However, it
might be the case that similarities between particular users (e.g., friendship,
common tastes, etc.) within the group might aect the recommendations, and
thus, change the resulting average satisfaction for some groups [8]. Also, user
relationships of trust and inuence might aect the item selection. There are
approaches for both automatically detecting groups [47, 48] (so as to avoid
the random selection of users) and dealing with social relationships among the
group members [49], so we plan to tackle these aspects in future work. Second,
the reliance of our current implementation of the users' utility function on the
prediction made by the SURs. All the rating predictions are made based on
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the conguration of the SUR and so increasing the quality of the predictions,
by using a dierent approach like the one proposed in [50], can help to improve
the recommendations produced by MAGReS. According to our ndings, the
datasets were small and their rating matrices were no dense enough for the
similarity metrics to work properly when making recommendations using a user-
based SUR. This factor impacted on how the utility function of the agents works,
and thus in the recommendations generated by MAGReS.
As a future work we plan to: (i) to compare our approach with other tech-
niques for group recommendation, (ii) evaluate our approach with real users,
(iii) assess the approach in a dataset with a more dense rating matrix, (iv)
study alternative utility functions for the agents, and (v) analyze new variants
for both the ARP and PrA strategies.
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Appendix A. Experimental Parameters Summary
In this appendix we will sum up all the parameters taken into consideration
in each of the experiments performed.
Appendix A.1. Similarity metrics
Mahout provides two types of recommendation techniques based on Collab-
orative Filtering: one user-based and one item-based. As it can be seen in Fig-
ure A.23, for each type of technique dierent similarity metrics are available. For
example, whilst Euclidean Distance similarity is available for both techniques,
Spearman Correlation is only available for the user-based recommenders and
Adjusted Cosine can only be used with the item-based recommenders.
Figure A.23: Similarity Metrics supported by each type of SUR (green = used in the experi-
ments, red = tested and discarded, N/A = it was not used in the experiments)
Appendix A.2. Approaches parameters
Appendix A.2.1. TRADGRec-PA and TRADGRec-RA parameters
For TRADGRec-PA and TRADGRec-RA there is only one parameter than
can be tuned: the preference aggregation strategy. At the moment the approach
supports only 5 aggregation strategies, which are specied in Figure A.24. The
parameters of those strategies can be found in Figure A.25.
Appendix A.2.2. MAGReS parameters
In MAGReS many parameters can be tuned and each one of them can assume
many possible values. In Figure A.26 we specify the most relevant parameters
for the experiments carried out in this paper and their possible values. As it
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Figure A.24: TRADGRec preference aggregation strategies
Figure A.25: TRADGRec preference aggregation strategies parameters. *values were ex-
tracted from [46]
can be seen in the gure some of the strategies can be further customized with
their own parameters. The range of valid values, the values we have used in the
tests and the ones we used when doing comparisons among variants of the same
strategy are detailed in Figure A.27.
Appendix A.3. Approaches parameterizations
Appendix A.3.1. TRADGRec-PA and TRADGRec-RA parameterizations
In Table A.28 we specify the most relevant parameterizations for TRADGRec-
PA and TRADGRec-RA.
Appendix A.3.2. MAGReS parameterizations
Taking into consideration the tables A.26 and A.27 it is possible to see
that there is a high amount of possible parameterizations for MAGReS. The
Table A.1 details all the parameterizations used to test the approach for this
paper, each one of them selected because they were relevant to the experiment
we needed to perform. For example, the One Step protocol performs only one
negotiation round which renders the PrA strategies Next and Relaxed useless.
In the rst case because it relies on what the agents would do in the next
negotiation round, and in the second case because of how the agreement is
determined (according to this protocol the agents agree on the item with the
higher utility product, which means that the PrA strategy is not used).
Each parameterization is identied by an ID which can be used to refer to
the parameterization itself. For example, saying that the parameterization M1






Figure A.26: MAGReS parameters
Figure A.27: MAGReS strategies parameters
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Figure A.28: TRADGRec-RA and TRADGRec-PA parameterizations
Concession strategy to Desires Distance and the ARP strategy to Easy-Going.
Appendix A.4. Experiments parameterizations
Appendix A.4.1. Single-User-Recommender experiment
For each of the similarity metrics listed with green background in the Ta-
ble A.23 we analized the results of the experiments that used the following
parameterizations:
 For MAGReS:
 One Step protocol: M19
 MCP protocol: M5, M11, M13 and M17.
 For TRADGRec-PA: T1 and T5.
 For TRADGRec-RA: T1 and T5.
Appendix A.4.2. ARP experiment
To evaluate the impact of the ARP strategies on the agents behavior we per-
formed experiments comparing the recommendations produced by the following
MAGReS parameterizations: M1, M2, M3, M4 and M5.
Appendix A.4.3. PrA experiment
The MAGReS parameterizations used in the experiments were: M 5, M 11,
M13, M15 and M17.
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Table A.1: MAGReS parameterizations
50
Appendix A.4.4. Information privacy experiment
For this experiment we decided to compare those parameterizations that
produced the best results in terms of information privacy.
 For TRADGRec-PA: T1 and T5.
 For TRADGRec-RA: T1 and T5.
 For MAGReS: M5, M11, M17, M19.
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